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When Hurricane Katrina flooded the city of New Orleans, one of
many concerns in its wake was contamination. Several chemical
plants, petroleum refining facilities, and contaminated sites, in-
cluding Superfund sites, were located in areas covered by flood-
waters. Some 565 oil spills were noted in the wake of Katrina as
a result of failures in the petroleum production and refining infra-
structure. In addition, hundreds of commercial establishments
such as service stations, pest control businesses, and dry cleaners
use potentially hazardous chemicals that may have been released
into the environment by the floodwaters. Adding to the potential
sources of toxics and environmental contaminants are metal-
contaminated soils typical of old urban areas and construction
lumber preserved with creosote, pentachlorophenol, and arsenic.
Compounding these concerns is the presence of hazardous chemi-
cals commonly stored in households and the fuel and motor oil in
approximately 400,000 flooded automobiles. Uncontrolled bio-
logical wastes from both human and animal sources also contrib-
uted to the pollutant burden in the city. Although the flooding in
New Orleans resulted in the potential for unparalleled exposure to
toxics and contaminants, initial concerns about a “toxic gumbo”
have not been supported by sampling and analyses to date. Al-
though floodwaters did contain significant short-term biological
hazards that posed risks to stranded residents and relief workers,
they did not contain chemical toxicants at levels that are expected
to lead to long-term impacts on the surroundings, beyond the
impacts expected of a similar volume of storm water from the city
Pardue et al. 2005.
Although floodwaters were removed from the city by October
11, 2005, their legacy of contaminated soils, sediments, debris,
and houses remained. Sediment mobilized from storm surge
1This editorial is an abridged version of an article that appeared in The
Bridge, a publication of the National Academy of Engineering, in March
2006.
JOURNAthrough Lake Pontchartrain and the Mississippi River Gulf
Outlet/Industrial Canal was deposited in the city. Presley et al.
2006 found several inorganic constituents arsenic, iron, and
lead and organic constituents mostly PAHs in sediments from
New Orleans that exceeded EPA Region VI Human Health Spe-
cific Screening Levels for soils. EPA also identified a number of
sediment samples that exceeded screening criteria of the local
regulatory authority EPA 2005, the Louisiana Department of
Environmental Quality Risk Evaluation/Corrective Action Pro-
gram or RECAP—LDEQ 2005. The constituents most often
found to exceed the RECAP screening criteria were arsenic, lead,
several PAHs including benzoapyrene, and diesel range
organics.
Screening levels, however, are not action levels or cleanup
levels but instead identify areas where no further investigation or
action is required. Screening levels are typically developed as-
suming conservative exposure scenarios that may not be appli-
cable, given the uniqueness of the short-term exposure pathways
associated with the hurricane. Action levels or concentration stan-
dards for cleanup might be defined using site-specific exposure
and contaminant fate and transport data. Although the sampling
and analysis required for a site-specific assessment and evaluation
approach can be costly, using screening levels as remedial goals
could also be costly unless there is some assurance of a commen-
surate reduction in risk. An individual homeowner can assess the
contamination on his or her property, but, in the absence of gov-
ernment support for testing and cleanup, the responsibility and
cost would fall disproportionately on the poor, effectively mean-
ing that little or no testing would be conducted on individual
properties. However, a generic response to potential contamina-
tion would undoubtedly lead to the destruction of property that
does not pose excessive risks and would further delay the return
of people to their homes.
Further complicating the evaluation of risk, the frequency and
distribution of elevated concentrations may not differ from pre-
Katrina conditions in the city. For example, about 40% of nearly
5,000 soil samples collected prior to the flooding showed lead
levels in excess of 400 mg/kg Mielke et al. 2004; Pelley 2006,
and background levels of arsenic are of the order of 10 mg/kg
throughout the Mississippi River Delta region of southern Loui-
siana Gustavsson et al. 2001. Thus, the question arises as to
whether individuals might be willing to delay their return and
even support decisions about which neighborhoods might be re-
built, based on pre-Katrina contamination levels. The cleanup
might be an opportunity to reduce exposure to toxics and other
contaminants, regardless of whether the contamination was pre-
or post-Katrina. However, this would undoubtedly require that the
citizens of New Orleans accept a diversion of reconstruction
funds to environmental cleanup. Other questions involving con-
tamination concerns will influence decisions about which neigh-
borhoods might be changed to lower exposure parklands or to
other uses, to the appropriate balance of expenditures for environ-
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mental restoration and flood protection, to administrative or legal
mechanisms for government to make decisions and for citizens to
appeal them, and to the role of government condemnations in
these decisions. Answers to these questions will be formed in the
coming months, both through systematic processes and by the
more chaotic process of personal decisions by individual return-
ing residents.
Although the focus of the previous discussion has been on
residual contamination of soils and sediments by toxics, even
more difficult assessment concerns are posed by the presence of
mold and airborne mold spores in homes. Unlike air, water, and
soil contamination, there is little scientific basis for evaluating the
potential effects of mold on human health or for developing risk-
based action or cleanup levels. Mold counts of 50,000 spores/m3
are considered very high; spore counts as high as
650,000 spores/m3 were observed by the Natural Resources De-
fense Council NRDC in a home in mid-city New Orleans
NRDC 2005. Because there are no standards to which these
mold counts can be compared, there is no clear regulatory respon-
sibility among federal agencies for indoor air. High mold counts
are cause for concern, however, and both NRDC and EPA recom-
mend that returning residents use respiratory protection and re-
move all porous construction materials, including carpets and dry-
wall, from flooded homes. The pervasive nature of mold
contamination of New Orleans in the aftermath of Hurricane Kat-
rina and the lack of knowledge on the risks of mold and airborne
mold spores suggest that additional research is needed to improve
our ability to respond to this problem.
Outlook and Recommendations
Cost effective guidance for remediation of any properties con-
taminated by Katrina requires site-specific assessment and evalu-
ation of areas where contaminants exceed adopted screening stan-
dards. Normally i.e., with no massive catastrophic event such as
Hurricane Katrina, existing institutions local government, insur-
ers, and banks, etc. could handle the volume of site-specific as-
sessments. However, in the wake of Hurricane Katrina and, by
analogy, other large-scale disasters, there is a need for uniformity
and equity in decision making. Several principles should guide
that decision making.
First, the scale of decision making in this case and the number
of people impacted by decisions about reconstruction are unprec-
edented. Thus, there are no “off-the-shelf”models that can be ap-
plied.
Second, rules by which decisions are made should be uniform,
transparent, and consistent with existing hazardous waste and
natural disaster cleanup criteria.
Third, there must be a balance between the cost of maximizing
equity by making case-by-case determinations and the need for
making many decisions in a relatively short period of time. In the
absence of rapid decisions and answers to the many outstanding
questions, individuals will proceed to define the future of New
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event, uniformity and equity are likely to suffer.
Finally, there must be a system of checks and balances to
ensure that government does not simply “take” individual prop-
erties. Checks and balances should be based on existing method-
ologies such as scientific peer review; public involvement; coop-
erative efforts between local, state, and federal agencies; and
public-private partnerships. The critical test of a legal process is
not whether an agency chooses the alternative preferred by the
public but whether the public perceives that the process is fair.
Ultimately, the lessons learned or missed from Katrina
should be crystallized in a generic form so that the country as a
whole will be better prepared for the next natural disaster, major
industrial accident, or act of terrorism. Thus, every effort should
be made to put aside partisan concerns to solve real, significant
problems in the way we process information in emergencies and
to make sensible, safe, and equitable cleanup/habitability deci-
sions in an environment of great uncertainty. Because existing
institutions were largely unprepared for a disaster of the scale of
Katrina, it may not be possible to implement these principles in
New Orleans. However, we can learn from Katrina and provide
more effective responses to future catastrophes.
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